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# GoMail — Action Plan v4 (post-Phase 9)
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**Status: Phases 1–9 complete and verified. Phases 10–15 remain.**
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This supersedes v3 for anything marked complete below. Where v3's design
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held up under actual implementation, it's summarized, not repeated — see
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v3 for full rationale on decisions that didn't change (encryption scheme,
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POP3 off-by-default, OAuth self-registration, time-based linked-account
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caching, etc.).
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---
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## What's built (Phases 1–9)
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| Phase | Package(s) | What it does | Status |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| 1 | `config`, `crypto`, `db` | YAML config + env secrets, HKDF-per-record encryption, SQLite schema/migrations, bootstrap | ✅ verified |
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| 2 | `smtp`, `mailstore`, `tlsutil` | Inbound MTA (:25/:587/:465), STARTTLS, SASL PLAIN/LOGIN, encrypted Maildir delivery | ✅ verified |
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| 3 | `dkim`, `queue` | DKIM sign/verify (stdlib crypto only), outbound retry queue, MX delivery via `net/smtp`, bounce DSN | ✅ verified |
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| 4 | `pipeline` | SPF/DKIM/DMARC/header/URL checks, quarantine storage, verdict scoring | ✅ verified against live DNS |
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| 5 | `imap`, `pop3`, `auth` | Full IMAP core command set, POP3 (off by default), shared credential verification | ✅ verified |
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| 6 | `accounts`, `imapclient` | `MailProvider` interface, local + generic-IMAP backends, hand-rolled IMAP client | ✅ verified (dogfoods own server) |
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| 7 | `vcard`, `ical`, `dav` | CalDAV/CardDAV server (PROPFIND/REPORT/PUT/GET/DELETE), encrypted contacts/events | ✅ verified |
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| 8 | `webtoken`, `webmail` | Hand-rolled JWT, REST API + dark Tailwind SPA (folders/messages/compose/quarantine) | ✅ verified |
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| 9 | `jmap` | JMAP Core/Mail subset (session, Core/echo, Mailbox/get, Email/query, Email/get) | ✅ verified |
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| 9.5 | `sieve`, `managesieve` | Sieve interpreter (RFC 5228 subset) + ManageSieve server (RFC 5804), wired into inbound delivery | ✅ verified |
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| 10 | `oauth2`, extended `accounts`/`imapclient`/`webmail` | Hand-rolled OAuth2 (auth code grant + refresh), XOAUTH2 IMAP login, webmail account-linking endpoints (CSRF-protected) | ✅ verified against fake OAuth2 server + fake XOAUTH2 IMAP stub — see note below |
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| 11 | `admin` | Admin portal: RBAC-gated REST API (global_admin/tenant_admin) + dark Tailwind SPA — tenants, domains (+DKIM keygen/rotation), users, list rules, outbound queue, global quarantine, dashboard stats | ✅ verified — full RBAC enforcement, real DKIM key generation/rotation checked cryptographically |
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| 13 | `acme`, `tlsutil` (ACMEManager) | Real ACME v2 client (RFC 8555): JWS/ES256 signing, HTTP-01 challenge, SNI-aware cert serving, encrypted storage, auto-renewal loop. Pulled forward from phase order — see rationale below. | ✅ verified against a from-scratch fake ACME server with real JWS/thumbprint verification — see note below |
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| 12 | `totp`, extended `webmail`/`db` | Auth hardening: TOTP MFA (RFC 6238) with two-step login, backup codes, app-password self-service UI, recovery-email password reset. Completed after Phase 13 since 13 was pulled forward — see Phase 13's entry above. | ✅ verified — TOTP checked against 5 real RFC 6238 published test vectors, full two-step login/backup-code/app-password/reset flows over real HTTP |
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| 14 | extended `pipeline` (ClamAV/Rspamd/LLM stages) | Optional external security services: real clamd INSTREAM protocol, real rspamd `/checkv2` HTTP API, OpenAI-compatible LLM classification (llama.cpp server) — all off by default, only added to the pipeline when configured | ✅ verified — genuine EICAR malware detection (byte-level, not canned), real rspamd score pass-through, LLM score capping, graceful negative-path handling for unreachable services |
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| 15 | `ratelimit`, fuzz tests, `install.sh`/`gomail.service`/`README.md` | Hardening + deploy: per-IP token-bucket rate limiting on every listener, fuzz tests on the 4 riskiest hand-written parsers, `go vet` pass, systemd install script + hardened unit, full README with DNS setup guide | ✅ verified — rate limiting proven under the race detector and over real sockets/HTTP, ~1.5M fuzz executions with zero panics, systemd unit verified with `systemd-analyze verify` |
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**~14,400 lines of Go**, one third-party runtime dependency beyond
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`mattn/go-sqlite3`/`golang.org/x/crypto`/`google/uuid`/`gopkg.in/yaml.v3` —
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everything else (SMTP, IMAP, POP3, JMAP, CalDAV/CardDAV, JWT, DKIM, SPF,
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DMARC) is hand-rolled on the Go standard library, per the original
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dependency-minimal requirement.
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### Deferred within completed phases (honest gaps, not hidden)
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- **DAV**: REPORT filter/time-range queries return the full collection, not
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a filtered subset. MKCALENDAR/MKCOL not implemented — default collection
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auto-created per user instead.
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- **IMAP**: no IDLE, CONDSTORE/QRESYNC, SORT/THREAD, or mailbox
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CREATE/DELETE/RENAME. Core command set only (see Phase 5 code comments).
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- **JMAP**: Email/set (flags/delete via JMAP), Email/import (send via
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JMAP), push (EventSource), and Mailbox/set are not implemented — the
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webmail SPA still uses Phase 8's direct REST API for all mutations.
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ManageSieve (RFC 5804) was paired with JMAP in the original plan and
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**was not started this phase at all** — full gap, see Phase 9.5 below.
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- **accounts.IMAPProvider.Move**: returns "not implemented" — needs IMAP
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APPEND, which isn't in the imapclient package yet.
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- **TLS**: self-signed cert generation only (`tlsutil`), no ACME. Every
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linked IMAP/SMTP connection uses `InsecureSkipVerify: true` as a known,
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commented gap — real cert trust (pinning or ACME) is Phase 13.
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---
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## Remaining phases
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### Phase 9.5 — ManageSieve + Sieve interpreter — ✅ COMPLETE
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`internal/sieve`: hand-written recursive-descent interpreter covering
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`if`/`elsif`/`else`, `header :contains`/`:is` tests, `fileinto`/`discard`/
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`keep`/`stop` actions. Verified: correct short-circuit on `stop`, correct
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RFC 5228 §4.4 "explicit keep after discard still delivers" semantics,
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malformed scripts rejected at parse time.
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`internal/managesieve`: RFC 5804 server on `:4190` — CAPABILITY, STARTTLS
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(auth refused before TLS, verified), AUTHENTICATE PLAIN, PUTSCRIPT (rejects
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syntactically invalid scripts at upload time via `sieve.Parse`), GETSCRIPT,
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LISTSCRIPTS, SETACTIVE (enforces exactly one active script per user),
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DELETESCRIPT, LOGOUT.
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Wired into `internal/smtp/session.go`'s local-delivery path: after the
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security pipeline clears a message (clean/flagged), the recipient's active
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Sieve script (if any) runs against the message headers and determines the
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destination folder or discard — verified end-to-end with a real SMTP
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delivery routed by an uploaded rule.
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**Deferred within this phase**: only `header` tests are supported (no
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`address`, `envelope`, `size`, `exists` tests); no `anyof`/`allof` boolean
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combinators (only single-condition if/elsif); no Sieve extensions
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(`vacation`, `reject`, `notify`, `imap4flags`); webmail visual rule builder
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not built — raw script upload via the ManageSieve protocol is the only
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interface (testable with `sieve-connect` or similar real clients).
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### Phase 10 — Multi-account webmail: OAuth2 + Gmail/M365 — ✅ PARTIALLY COMPLETE
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**What's done and verified:**
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- `internal/oauth2`: hand-rolled OAuth2 authorization-code grant + refresh
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(RFC 6749 §4.1, §6), ~150 lines, stdlib `net/http`+`encoding/json` only.
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`WellKnownEndpoints("google"|"microsoft")` returns the real fixed
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endpoint URLs — not operator-configurable, matching how real integrations
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work (only Client ID/Secret are operator-supplied).
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- `imapclient.LoginXOAUTH2`: SASL XOAUTH2 mechanism for connecting to
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Gmail/M365 with a bearer token instead of a password.
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- `accounts.IMAPProvider` extended: branches on `AuthType` — password
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accounts unchanged, OAuth2 accounts decrypt a stored token, transparently
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refresh it if expired (persisting the new token to avoid re-refreshing
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on every call), and authenticate via XOAUTH2.
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- `accounts.LinkOAuth2Account` / `wellKnownIMAPHost`: stores encrypted
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OAuth2 tokens, points Gmail/M365 accounts at their real documented IMAP
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hosts (`imap.gmail.com:993`, `outlook.office365.com:993`).
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- `webmail` API: `/api/accounts` (list), `/api/accounts/{id}` (unlink),
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`/api/accounts/oauth/{provider}/start` (builds auth URL, stores
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CSRF state server-side keyed to the authenticated user),
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`/api/accounts/oauth/{provider}/callback` (validates state — rejects
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unknown AND replayed state, verified — exchanges code, links account).
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- **Verified** with a from-scratch fake OAuth2 authorization server
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(`/authorize` + `/token`, both grant types) and a fake XOAUTH2-accepting
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IMAP stub — full round trip: start → redirect → callback → encrypted
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token storage → real XOAUTH2 IMAP login → forced token expiry → transparent
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refresh → persisted new token. This is real protocol-correctness
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verification; it does **not** touch real Google/Microsoft infrastructure,
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since no real app credentials exist in the dev environment this was
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built in. **The next session should register a real Google Cloud OAuth
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app (or ask the person for one) and do one live end-to-end test against
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actual Gmail before considering this phase fully closed** — the protocol
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layer is proven, but "does real Gmail's token endpoint actually behave
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the way RFC 6749 says it should" has not been checked against the real
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service.
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**Deferred within this phase:**
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- Native Gmail API / Microsoft Graph API providers (`GmailProvider`,
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`M365Provider` as distinct from the IMAP+OAuth2 path) — per the locked
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decision, mail goes through `IMAPProvider` with OAuth2 credentials for
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now; native API push (Gmail watch+Pub/Sub, Graph delta webhooks) is
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Phase 14 per the original plan.
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- Calendar/contacts via native Graph API / Gmail Calendar+People API — not
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started. No IMAP fallback exists for these, so this is still fully
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greenfield work reusing the OAuth2 token store just built.
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- Webmail UI: account switcher, unified "All Inboxes" view, per-account
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"send as" in compose, federated search — the backend
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(`/api/accounts`) exists but the SPA has no UI for any of this yet.
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- Real userinfo/profile API call to learn the linked account's actual
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email address at callback time — currently accepts an `?email=` query
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param as a stand-in (noted in code); a real implementation calls
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Google's `userinfo` endpoint or Microsoft Graph's `/me` with the fresh
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access token.
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- `IMAPProvider.Move` still returns "not implemented" (needs IMAP APPEND,
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unchanged from Phase 6).
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### Phase 11 — Admin portal — ✅ COMPLETE (core CRUD)
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**What's done and verified:**
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- `internal/admin`: REST API + embedded dark Tailwind SPA, JWT sessions
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(same `webtoken` scheme as webmail), role checked at auth time AND
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re-checked against the live DB row on every request (a demoted admin's
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existing token stops working immediately, not just after expiry).
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- **Tenants**: list/create, global_admin only (verified: tenant_admin gets
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403).
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- **Domains**: list/create/delete, real DKIM key generation on create
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(verified: stored key decrypts and parses as a genuine RSA private key,
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not just "a create call succeeded"), DKIM rotation (verified: key
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material genuinely changes, not a no-op). global_admin defaults to their
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own tenant if none specified; tenant_admin forced to their own tenant
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regardless of what they send.
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- **Users**: list/create/suspend/activate/reset-password/delete.
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tenant_admin scoped to their own tenant and blocked from creating or
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modifying admin-role accounts (verified: 403 on a privilege-escalation
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attempt).
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- **List rules**: list/create/delete, tenant-scoped.
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- **Outbound queue**: list, retry-now (verified: `next_attempt_at`
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genuinely rescheduled to immediate, not just a 200 response), cancel.
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- **Global quarantine**: list, discard (verified: status genuinely
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transitions to `deleted` in the DB). Per-user *release* (as opposed to
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discard) already existed in webmail from Phase 8 — this is the
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admin-wide review/cleanup view, not a duplicate of that.
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- **Dashboard**: user/domain counts, 24h message count, queue depth,
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quarantine-held count.
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**Two real bugs caught by testing, both fixed:**
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1. `global_admin` has no *forced* tenant (unlike `tenant_admin`), but every
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domain still needs one — domain creation 400'd with "tenant_id is
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required" until a fallback to the admin's own tenant was added.
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2. User creation requires a valid `domain_id` (a mailbox must belong to a
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domain) — neither the test nor the admin SPA's "Add User" form supplied
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one at first. Fixed in both: the SPA now has a domain ID field, and the
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Domains page shows each domain's ID (click to copy) so there's an actual
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way to get that value into the form.
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**Deferred within this phase:**
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- Aliases CRUD (table exists, no admin UI yet).
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- Pipeline settings UI (per-tenant score thresholds / check toggles) — the
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`tenants.settings_json` column exists but nothing reads or writes it yet;
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pipeline behavior is still entirely driven by the global `config.Pipeline`
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values.
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- TLS cert status view, DMARC/TLS-RPT report viewer — both depend on
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Phase 13 (ACME/DANE/MTA-STS) existing first.
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- Live log viewer (SSE) — webmail's `sseEvents` pattern from Phase 8 is
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directly reusable here, just not wired up yet.
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- Admin IP allowlist (`admin_ip_allowlist` in config) is not enforced at
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the HTTP layer — the admin server binds to `127.0.0.1` by default, which
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covers the common case, but the config value itself is currently inert.
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### Phase 13 — TLS + ACME + DANE/MTA-STS — ✅ CORE COMPLETE (pulled forward)
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Pulled ahead of strict phase order per the reasoning that closing the
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`InsecureSkipVerify` gap improves the security posture of everything
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already built more than most net-new features would — see the handover
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doc for the fuller rationale.
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**What's done and verified:**
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- `internal/acme`: hand-rolled ACME v2 client (RFC 8555) — no third-party
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ACME/JOSE library. `jws.go` implements JWS signing (ES256, flattened
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JSON serialization per RFC 7515) and RFC 7638 JWK thumbprint computation
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from scratch. `client.go` implements the full protocol: directory fetch,
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nonce management, account registration, order creation, authorization
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polling, HTTP-01 challenge response, CSR building, finalize, and
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certificate download. `challenge.go` is the HTTP-01 responder
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(`/.well-known/acme-challenge/{token}`). `obtain.go` is the high-level
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orchestration function tying it together.
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- `internal/tlsutil/acme_manager.go`: `ACMEManager` provides SNI-aware
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certificate serving (`tls.Config.GetCertificate`), encrypted-at-rest
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storage (same HKDF-per-record scheme as messages/contacts/DKIM keys —
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new `tls_certs` table, migration 0010), in-memory caching, and a
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background renewal loop (checks daily by default, renews within 30 days
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of expiry).
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- Wired into `cmd/gomail/main.go`: when `tls.mode: acme` and
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`tls.acme_domains` are configured, a real `ACMEManager` drives cert
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serving instead of the self-signed fallback, and a plain `:80` listener
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serves the HTTP-01 challenge responder. Falls back to self-signed with a
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now-accurate warning message when ACME mode is set but no domains are
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configured, or when mode is `off`.
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- **Verified** with a from-scratch fake ACME server (`cmd/e2etest13`,
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deleted after passing per the established pattern) that does *real*
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protocol-level verification, not a rubber stamp: ES256 JWS signature
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verification against the account's actual public key, RFC 7638
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thumbprint recomputation from that key, and a genuine HTTP callback to
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the challenge responder to check the key authorization matches — exactly
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what a real CA does. Confirmed: full obtain flow succeeds; the issued
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certificate works in an actual `tls.Dial` handshake with the correct
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`CommonName`; the certificate is encrypted at rest (checked the raw DB
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column, then decrypted and confirmed it's a real PEM cert); a second
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call hits the cache instead of re-issuing; a tampered JWS signature is
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correctly rejected; and — importantly — finalizing an order without
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completing domain validation is correctly refused with 403, proving the
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fake CA (and by extension, the real protocol logic our client drives)
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won't issue a certificate without genuine authorization.
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- Two stale/inaccurate log messages caught and fixed while wiring this in:
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the self-signed fallback's warning previously claimed "ACME is not yet
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implemented (Phase 13)" — no longer true, so the message is now
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context-aware (distinguishes "acme mode but no domains configured" from
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"mode is off entirely"). A comment in `accounts.IMAPProvider` about
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`InsecureSkipVerify` was similarly updated to reflect that the gap is
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now narrower (GoMail's own server can get a real cert; a *linked*
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external account's server is still outside our control regardless).
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**Deferred within this phase** (genuinely not started, not just
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untested):
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- DANE (TLSA record lookup + verification for outbound delivery) — not
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implemented.
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- MTA-STS (fetch/cache `.well-known/mta-sts.txt`, enforce TLS to declared
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MX hosts) — not implemented.
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- TLS-RPT (aggregate report generation/sending) — not implemented.
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- ACME DNS-01 challenge type (only HTTP-01 is implemented) — DNS-01 is
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necessary for wildcard certs, which GoMail doesn't currently need, but
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worth naming as a real gap rather than assuming HTTP-01 is sufficient
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forever.
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- No live test against a real CA (Let's Encrypt staging or production) —
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same category of limitation as Phase 10's OAuth2: no real public
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domain/DNS control in this sandbox to satisfy HTTP-01 validation from
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the actual internet. **The protocol implementation is proven correct
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against a genuinely-verifying fake server; a live run against Let's
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Encrypt staging is the natural first action for whoever continues this,
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same recommendation as Phase 10's OAuth caveat.**
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- Every `InsecureSkipVerify: true` in the codebase (linked IMAP accounts,
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the ACME manager's own... actually the ACME manager doesn't skip
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||||
verification, only the *generic IMAP/OAuth2 linked account* paths in
|
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`internal/accounts` still do, since those connect to servers outside
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||||
GoMail's control) is not yet an argument for removal — search the
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codebase for that string to find remaining call sites.
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### Phase 12 — Auth hardening — ✅ CORE COMPLETE (TOTP + app passwords + reset)
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Completed after Phase 13 in this session's actual order (13 was pulled
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forward for its security-posture impact; this closed the gap in numeric
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order afterward).
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||||
**What's done and verified:**
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- `internal/totp`: hand-rolled RFC 6238 TOTP (HOTP RFC 4226 underneath) —
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no third-party OTP library. **Verified against 5 of RFC 6238's own
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published Appendix B test vectors** (not just internal self-consistency):
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our 6-digit output exactly matches the last 6 digits of each published
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8-digit reference vector, which is mathematically guaranteed to hold only
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if the HMAC-SHA1 counter derivation and truncation are byte-for-byte
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correct. Also verified: ±30s clock-skew tolerance works and correctly has
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a boundary (120s does NOT validate), and the `otpauth://` provisioning
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URI is well-formed.
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- Two-step login: `POST /api/auth/login` returns `{mfa_required: true,
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mfa_token: <5-min pre-auth token>}` instead of a session when
|
||||
`user.MFAEnabled` — `POST /api/auth/mfa-verify` redeems that token plus
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||||
either a valid TOTP code or an unused backup code for a real session.
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The pre-auth token is a genuinely distinct, narrowly-scoped token type
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(`webtoken.Claims.Purpose = "mfa_pending"`), not just a normal session
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||||
token handed out early.
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- MFA setup/confirm/disable: `POST /api/me/mfa/setup` generates a secret
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and stores it encrypted but **not yet enabled** — `POST
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/api/me/mfa/confirm` requires one valid code before MFA actually takes
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effect and backup codes are issued, so an abandoned setup never locks
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anyone out. 8 backup codes (SHA-256 hashed, one-time use, verified) are
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shown to the user exactly once, matching the app-password pattern.
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`POST /api/me/mfa/disable` re-requires the password (a session token
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alone isn't enough to turn MFA off).
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- App passwords: full self-service CRUD
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||||
(`GET/POST /api/me/app-passwords`, `DELETE
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||||
/api/me/app-passwords/{id}`) — the server-side scope-checking machinery
|
||||
already existed from Phase 5, this phase added the UI-facing API.
|
||||
Verified: the raw token is returned exactly once at creation and never
|
||||
re-appears in the listing response.
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||||
- Password reset: `POST /api/auth/forgot-password` +
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||||
`POST /api/auth/reset-password`, gated on a user-configured
|
||||
`recovery_email` (new `users.recovery_email` column) rather than the
|
||||
account's own mailbox — deliberately avoids the chicken-and-egg problem
|
||||
of emailing a reset link to a mailbox the person is locked out of.
|
||||
Verified: a genuine outbound-queue entry is created addressed to the
|
||||
recovery email (real delivery infrastructure, not a stub), and the
|
||||
endpoint returns the identical response whether or not the account
|
||||
exists (no account-existence leak via response differences).
|
||||
|
||||
**Two real bugs found and fixed while testing, both worth remembering:**
|
||||
1. `db.GetUser` was built in Phase 11 for admin's minimal display needs
|
||||
(id/email/role/active) and never extended when Phase 12 code started
|
||||
depending on it for MFA fields — `mfa_confirm` failed with "no pending
|
||||
MFA setup" even though setup had just succeeded, because the fetch
|
||||
silently dropped `totp_secret_enc`. Fixed by making `GetUser` the one
|
||||
canonical full-row fetch rather than fragmenting into
|
||||
admin-flavored/auth-flavored variants.
|
||||
2. **A genuine SQLite connection-pool deadlock** in `ConsumeBackupCode`:
|
||||
it ran a `db.Query` (find the matching backup code) followed by a
|
||||
`db.Exec` (mark it used) in the same function, but this database is
|
||||
capped to a single open connection (`SetMaxOpenConns(1)`, see
|
||||
`internal/db/db.go`) — calling `Exec` while the `Query`'s `rows` was
|
||||
still open (only deferred-closed, not yet executed) caused the request
|
||||
to hang forever waiting for a connection that could only free up
|
||||
*after* the function returned. Fixed by closing `rows` explicitly
|
||||
before the `Exec`. **The codebase was then scanned for the same
|
||||
pattern** (any function mixing `Query` and `Exec`) and this was
|
||||
confirmed isolated — worth doing that scan again after any future
|
||||
change that mixes both in one function, given SQLite's single-connection
|
||||
constraint makes this an easy trap to fall into.
|
||||
|
||||
**Deferred within this phase:**
|
||||
- **Passkey/WebAuthn — not started at all**, and deliberately so: it
|
||||
requires CBOR decoding for attestation/assertion objects, which is not
|
||||
in Go's standard library and would be a meaningfully sized sub-project
|
||||
of its own (on the order of the JWS/ACME work in Phase 13), with little
|
||||
shared surface with anything else in this codebase. `users.
|
||||
passkey_credentials_json` exists in the schema as a placeholder for
|
||||
when this is picked up.
|
||||
- QR code rendering for TOTP setup is not implemented — `totp.
|
||||
ProvisioningURI` returns the `otpauth://` URI as plain text, which every
|
||||
mainstream authenticator app accepts as manual entry; actual QR
|
||||
rendering (Reed-Solomon error correction, matrix placement) is real
|
||||
standalone work, noted in `totp.go`'s doc comment rather than silently
|
||||
skipped.
|
||||
- No webmail SPA pages for any of this yet — MFA setup/confirm, app
|
||||
password management, and recovery-email configuration are all
|
||||
functional, tested REST endpoints with no frontend UI. The existing
|
||||
`internal/webmail/static/index.html` pattern is directly reusable, just
|
||||
not built out for these yet.
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 14 — Optional external services — ✅ CORE COMPLETE (ClamAV/Rspamd/LLM)
|
||||
|
||||
**What's done and verified:**
|
||||
- `internal/pipeline/stage_clamav.go`: `ClamAVStage` speaks clamd's real
|
||||
documented INSTREAM binary protocol by hand — no third-party clamd
|
||||
client library. Send `"zINSTREAM\0"`, then the message in 4-byte-
|
||||
big-endian-length-prefixed chunks terminated by a zero-length chunk,
|
||||
then read the single-line response. Accepts `unix:` or `tcp:` prefixed
|
||||
addresses. A detected match is always a hard block (score 100) rather
|
||||
than a scored contribution, since malware detection isn't a "maybe."
|
||||
**Verified with a genuine EICAR test-string detection** — the fake
|
||||
clamd test server actually reassembles the streamed chunks and inspects
|
||||
the bytes for the real industry-standard EICAR signature, the same way
|
||||
real clamd does, rather than returning a canned response; a clean
|
||||
message correctly passes, and an unreachable clamd is handled as
|
||||
`CheckError` rather than crashing or hanging.
|
||||
- `internal/pipeline/stage_rspamd.go`: `RspamdStage` POSTs the raw
|
||||
RFC 5322 message to rspamd's real documented `/checkv2` HTTP endpoint
|
||||
and maps its JSON response (`score`, `action`, `symbols`) onto this
|
||||
pipeline's result model — `reject` → `CheckFail`, `add header`/
|
||||
`rewrite subject`/`greylist` → `CheckWarn`, anything else → `CheckPass`.
|
||||
rspamd's own score is passed through directly rather than being
|
||||
rescaled, since both scales are already meant to be compared against
|
||||
configurable thresholds the same way. Verified: score pass-through is
|
||||
exact, action-to-result mapping is correct for all three cases tested.
|
||||
- `internal/pipeline/stage_llm.go`: `LLMStage` calls the OpenAI-compatible
|
||||
`/v1/chat/completions` endpoint that llama.cpp's server (and most other
|
||||
local-inference servers) expose — no llama.cpp-specific protocol
|
||||
needed. The model is asked for a single 0-100 integer; parsing extracts
|
||||
the first run of digits rather than requiring an exact match, since
|
||||
local models don't always follow format instructions exactly (verified
|
||||
with a deliberately messy response — extra whitespace and trailing
|
||||
commentary — that still parses correctly). LLM output is capped at 30
|
||||
points of total score contribution regardless of what the model
|
||||
returns, since non-deterministic model output shouldn't singlehandedly
|
||||
quarantine mail the way a deterministic SPF/DKIM/DMARC failure can —
|
||||
verified the cap applies correctly (raw score 95/100 → capped
|
||||
contribution 28.5, not 95).
|
||||
- `pipeline.StagesFromConfig`: builds `DefaultStages()` (the always-on
|
||||
deterministic set) plus any of the three optional stages whose config
|
||||
field (`clamav_socket` / `rspamd_url` / `llm_url`) is non-empty — an
|
||||
unconfigured optional service is genuinely **absent** from the pipeline,
|
||||
not merely present-but-disabled, so a misconfigured or unreachable
|
||||
service that was never meant to be used can't accidentally affect
|
||||
delivery. Verified: 5 stages with nothing configured, 8 with all three
|
||||
configured. Wired into `cmd/gomail/main.go` in place of the old
|
||||
`DefaultStages()` call.
|
||||
|
||||
**One real bug found and fixed while testing — in the test's fake clamd
|
||||
server, not the product code**: the fake server's initial read of the
|
||||
`"zINSTREAM\0"` command used a generic buffered `conn.Read()` call with a
|
||||
32-byte buffer, which could over-read into the *next* protocol bytes (TCP
|
||||
doesn't preserve write-call boundaries, so a client's separate `Write()`
|
||||
calls can arrive coalesced in one read). That silently desynced the fake
|
||||
server's chunk-length parsing loop, which then hung waiting for bytes that
|
||||
had already been consumed — manifesting as an i/o timeout on the *client*
|
||||
side, initially indistinguishable from a real product bug. Fixed by
|
||||
switching the fake server to a `bufio.Reader` with exact-length
|
||||
`io.ReadFull` reads for both the command and every subsequent chunk.
|
||||
Worth remembering as a general pattern for any future protocol work over
|
||||
raw TCP: never assume one `Read()` call aligns with the sender's `Write()`
|
||||
call boundaries.
|
||||
|
||||
**Deferred within this phase:**
|
||||
- Gmail API push (watch+Pub/Sub) and Microsoft Graph delta webhooks, to
|
||||
replace Phase 10's IMAP polling for linked accounts — not started.
|
||||
- No live test against real ClamAV, rspamd, or a real llama.cpp server —
|
||||
same category of limitation as Phase 10's OAuth2 and Phase 13's ACME:
|
||||
the protocol implementations are proven correct against genuinely-
|
||||
behaving fake servers, but never against the real services. If the
|
||||
operator has any of these installed, pointing `clamav_socket` /
|
||||
`rspamd_url` / `llm_url` at them and sending one real test message
|
||||
(the EICAR string is safe and appropriate for this) is the natural
|
||||
first live-test.
|
||||
- No admin UI toggle for these — they're config-file only
|
||||
(`pipeline.clamav_socket`, `pipeline.rspamd_url`, `pipeline.llm_url`/
|
||||
`llm_model` in `config.yaml`), consistent with how they were already
|
||||
scaffolded as plain fields back in Phase 1.
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 15 — Hardening + deploy — ✅ CORE COMPLETE (last phase in the plan)
|
||||
|
||||
**What's done and verified:**
|
||||
- `internal/ratelimit`: hand-rolled per-key token-bucket limiter (no
|
||||
third-party rate-limiting library) — a token bucket rather than a fixed
|
||||
window deliberately, to avoid the classic "burst allowed at both edges
|
||||
of a reset boundary" flaw a naive counter has. `rate=0` cleanly disables
|
||||
limiting for a given listener rather than blocking everything, which is
|
||||
how an unset config value opts out. **Verified under Go's race
|
||||
detector** with 500 concurrent goroutines against a rate=100 limiter —
|
||||
exactly 100 allowed, zero drift, proving the mutex genuinely serializes
|
||||
access rather than merely looking correct single-threaded. Then proven
|
||||
over real sockets and real HTTP: a real TCP listener genuinely
|
||||
rejecting connections past the limit, a real `httptest` server
|
||||
returning genuine 429s past the limit, and a specific check that
|
||||
`X-Forwarded-For` trust correctly keys the limiter on the forwarded IP
|
||||
rather than the raw socket peer (only trusted when
|
||||
`server.real_ip_header` is explicitly configured — untrusted otherwise,
|
||||
since blindly trusting it would let any client spoof their rate-limit
|
||||
identity).
|
||||
- Wired into every listener: SMTP (per-IP connection limit at accept
|
||||
time, plus a separate limiter on AUTH attempts specifically, checked
|
||||
before any credential parsing happens), IMAP (per-IP connection limit
|
||||
at accept time), and a single **shared** limiter across DAV, webmail,
|
||||
admin, and external JMAP — deliberately one combined per-IP budget
|
||||
across all of them, not one each, since a client hitting its limit on
|
||||
one HTTP surface shouldn't get a fresh budget by switching to another.
|
||||
- Fuzz tests (`go test -fuzz`, real `*_fuzz_test.go` files — the first
|
||||
standard Go test files in this repo; everything before this used
|
||||
disposable `cmd/e2etestN` directories) on the four hand-written parsers
|
||||
most exposed to untrusted network input: `vcard.Parse`, `ical.Parse`,
|
||||
`sieve.Parse` (explicitly flagged as the highest-stakes target, since
|
||||
every ManageSieve `PUTSCRIPT` runs through it), and IMAP's `tokenize`
|
||||
(runs on every line a connected client sends, before authentication
|
||||
necessarily succeeds). Each actually run for 15s, not just written:
|
||||
~400K–590K executions per target, ~1.5M executions total, zero panics.
|
||||
- `go vet ./...` — clean across the entire codebase.
|
||||
**`staticcheck` was attempted but is not runnable in this sandbox** — it
|
||||
requires a newer Go toolchain than this network-restricted environment
|
||||
can fetch (same class of limitation documented elsewhere in this plan
|
||||
for the real Go 1.25.6 toolchain). This is a real, disclosed gap: `go
|
||||
vet` provides real but narrower coverage than `staticcheck` would.
|
||||
Running `staticcheck ./...` on a real machine with normal internet
|
||||
access is a legitimate quick win for whoever continues this.
|
||||
- `install.sh`: creates a dedicated system user (no login shell), sets up
|
||||
`/etc/gomail`, `/var/lib/gomail`, `/var/log/gomail` with correct
|
||||
ownership, builds and installs the binary, generates
|
||||
`GOMAIL_MASTER_KEY`/`GOMAIL_JWT_SECRET` into a mode-600 env file if none
|
||||
exist, installs and enables (but does not start) the systemd unit.
|
||||
Syntax-checked with `bash -n` (clean); `shellcheck` isn't available in
|
||||
this sandbox either, so deeper static analysis of the script itself is
|
||||
another real machine follow-up.
|
||||
- `gomail.service`: systemd unit with genuine hardening — capability-based
|
||||
privileged-port binding (`AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE`)
|
||||
instead of running as root, plus `ProtectSystem=strict`,
|
||||
`ProtectHome`, `PrivateTmp`, `PrivateDevices`, kernel/clock/hostname
|
||||
protection, namespace/SUID/realtime restrictions,
|
||||
`MemoryDenyWriteExecute` (with an inline comment flagging it as the
|
||||
first thing to try removing if the CGO-based binary fails to start
|
||||
under it — `mattn/go-sqlite3` requires CGO), and a syscall filter.
|
||||
**Actually verified with `systemd-analyze verify`** (available in this
|
||||
sandbox, unlike `staticcheck`/`shellcheck`) — returned clean against a
|
||||
dummy executable standing in for the real binary.
|
||||
- `README.md`: quick start, TLS/ACME guidance (including the
|
||||
staging-before-production reminder from Phase 13's own caveat), and a
|
||||
full DNS setup section — MX, SPF, DKIM (with the exact record shape
|
||||
GoMail logs at bootstrap), DMARC, all with real example values and
|
||||
guidance on starting permissive (`~all`, `p=quarantine`) before
|
||||
tightening. MTA-STS/TLS-RPT sections are present but honestly marked
|
||||
not-yet-implemented rather than filled with placeholder content.
|
||||
|
||||
**Deferred within this phase:**
|
||||
- `staticcheck` and `shellcheck` — both blocked by sandbox network/
|
||||
toolchain restrictions, not by any decision; run both on a real machine.
|
||||
- No fuzz corpus regression files exist yet (expected — Go only persists
|
||||
a corpus entry to `testdata/fuzz/` on an actual crash, and none of the
|
||||
15s runs found one; longer fuzzing runs on a real machine, especially
|
||||
with `-fuzztime` measured in hours rather than seconds, stand a better
|
||||
chance of finding something a 15-second burst didn't).
|
||||
- No fuzz targets for the SMTP command parser or JMAP JSON handling
|
||||
specifically — the four targets chosen were judged highest-value for
|
||||
the time available; SMTP's command parsing is somewhat covered
|
||||
indirectly by the SMTP E2E tests from earlier phases but not fuzzed
|
||||
directly, and JMAP's JSON handling rides on `encoding/json`, which is
|
||||
already extensively fuzzed upstream in the Go project itself.
|
||||
- No log rotation configuration, no monitoring/metrics endpoint, no
|
||||
backup tooling for the SQLite database or Maildir tree — genuinely
|
||||
unstarted, not scoped in the original Phase 15 description either.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Project status: all 15 phases from the original plan have now been
|
||||
## touched, 13 of them completed and verified
|
||||
|
||||
Phase 10 (native Gmail/Graph API, webmail account-switcher UI) and Phase
|
||||
11 (aliases CRUD, per-tenant pipeline settings UI) remain "partially" or
|
||||
"core" complete with named remaining pieces — see their entries above.
|
||||
Every other phase reached a genuinely complete, tested state. This does
|
||||
**not** mean the project is finished in an absolute sense — every phase's
|
||||
entry above lists real deferred items, and the live-service verification
|
||||
caveats (OAuth2 against real Google, ACME against real Let's Encrypt
|
||||
staging) are still open — but the plan as originally scoped has been
|
||||
worked through in full, not just partially sampled.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Architecture notes that matter for continuation
|
||||
|
||||
### Dependency management in a network-restricted sandbox
|
||||
The Anthropic sandbox this was built in blocks `proxy.golang.org` and
|
||||
`sum.golang.org` — only `github.com` (plus npm/pypi, irrelevant here) is
|
||||
reachable. Every session that needed a new dependency had to:
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
git clone --depth=1 --branch vX.Y.Z https://github.com/OWNER/REPO.git /tmp/REPO
|
||||
```
|
||||
then add a `replace` directive in `go.mod` pointing at `/tmp/REPO`. **This
|
||||
does not apply on a real machine with normal internet access** — `go.mod`
|
||||
ships with real version requires and no replace directives; `go mod tidy`
|
||||
will just work. The `go.mod.production` file in each phase's tarball is
|
||||
already the clean version with no local paths.
|
||||
|
||||
### Go version
|
||||
Sandbox only had Go 1.22/1.23 available via `apt`; the user's real target
|
||||
is **1.25.6**. Every phase's shippable `go.mod` declares `go 1.25.6`; all
|
||||
sandbox development/testing happened against 1.22 syntax (no
|
||||
version-specific features used, so this is a non-issue functionally) with
|
||||
the directive temporarily lowered for local builds, then restored before
|
||||
packaging. **On the real 1.25.6 toolchain, nothing needs to change.**
|
||||
|
||||
### Sandbox environment quirks discovered (informational, not GoMail bugs)
|
||||
- The sandbox's default shell is `/bin/sh`, not bash — brace expansion
|
||||
(`mkdir -p {a,b}`) silently creates a literal directory named `{a,b}`
|
||||
instead of two directories. Always use explicit `bash -c` or separate
|
||||
`mkdir` calls.
|
||||
- The sandbox container has reset entirely mid-session at least once
|
||||
(Go toolchain, `/tmp`, and the whole working directory vanished) and
|
||||
resets `/etc/hosts` between *every* tool call. Backgrounded long-running
|
||||
processes (`&` + later `kill`) don't reliably survive across tool call
|
||||
boundaries either. **The working pattern that survived all of this**:
|
||||
write E2E tests as a single self-contained `go run` invocation that
|
||||
starts the server in-process (as a goroutine) and exercises it as a
|
||||
client in the same process — never rely on a detached background
|
||||
process still being alive in a later tool call.
|
||||
- Because of the above, **always keep a tarball of the last-known-good
|
||||
state in `/mnt/user-data/outputs`** — that survived every reset and was
|
||||
the actual recovery mechanism used once.
|
||||
|
||||
### Testing pattern used throughout
|
||||
Every phase has (had, before cleanup) a `cmd/e2etestN/main.go` that:
|
||||
1. Boots the real server(s) for that phase as goroutines in the same process
|
||||
2. Acts as a real client over the real wire protocol (raw TCP for
|
||||
SMTP/IMAP/POP3, real `net/http` for DAV/webmail/JMAP)
|
||||
3. Asserts against actual database state, not just protocol response codes
|
||||
4. Is deleted after the phase's tests pass — **not shipped** in the
|
||||
tarballs, since it's sandbox-only scaffolding, not part of the product
|
||||
|
||||
**When continuing this project, recreate this pattern per phase** — it
|
||||
caught a genuine bug in nearly every phase (see "Bugs actually found"
|
||||
below) that a build-only check would have missed entirely.
|
||||
|
||||
### Bugs actually found by this testing pattern (worth remembering the *pattern*, not the specific fixes)
|
||||
- NULL-scan panics from `sql.NullString`-shaped columns not being wrapped
|
||||
correctly (Phase 2, Phase 3)
|
||||
- A whole SMTP port (`:465` implicit TLS) silently not receiving the
|
||||
outbound-relay code path because a check only looked for one of two
|
||||
equivalent session kinds (Phase 2/3)
|
||||
- Foreign-key ordering: child rows inserted before their parent row
|
||||
existed (Phase 4)
|
||||
- Regex `.` not matching embedded `\r\n` from IMAP literals — an entire
|
||||
class of FETCH responses silently parsed as empty (Phase 6)
|
||||
- Wrong wire command entirely (`FETCH UID 1` sent instead of `UID FETCH
|
||||
1`) — server correctly returned nothing, client incorrectly assumed
|
||||
"not found" (Phase 6)
|
||||
- Missing `json` struct tags meant to the wire API would have shipped
|
||||
`TotalCount` instead of `total_count` (Phase 8) — caught before it ever
|
||||
ran, not after
|
||||
|
||||
**Takeaway for whoever continues this: don't trust "it compiles" or even
|
||||
"the happy-path test passed once." Write the negative-path tests (wrong
|
||||
auth, cross-user access, malformed input) every time — they found real
|
||||
bugs in every single phase.**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## File map (as of end of Phase 15 — the full plan)
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
gomail/
|
||||
├── cmd/gomail/main.go # wires everything together
|
||||
├── go.mod / go.mod.production # sandbox-dev vs real-deploy versions
|
||||
├── install.sh # system user, directories, secrets, systemd install
|
||||
├── gomail.service # hardened systemd unit — verified with systemd-analyze
|
||||
├── README.md # quick start, TLS/ACME guidance, DNS setup guide
|
||||
├── internal/
|
||||
│ ├── accounts/ # MailProvider interface + local/IMAP backends
|
||||
│ ├── auth/ # shared password + app-password verification
|
||||
│ ├── config/ # YAML + env config loader
|
||||
│ ├── crypto/ # HKDF-per-record AES-256-GCM encryption
|
||||
│ ├── db/ # schema, migrations, all queries
|
||||
│ ├── dav/ # CalDAV/CardDAV HTTP server
|
||||
│ ├── dkim/ # DKIM sign + verify (stdlib crypto)
|
||||
│ ├── ical/ # minimal RFC 5545 parser/builder
|
||||
│ ├── imap/ # IMAP server (core command set)
|
||||
│ ├── imapclient/ # hand-rolled IMAP client
|
||||
│ ├── jmap/ # JMAP Core/Mail subset
|
||||
│ ├── acme/ # ACME v2 client (RFC 8555) — JWS signing, full protocol flow
|
||||
│ ├── admin/ # admin portal REST API + embedded dark Tailwind SPA
|
||||
│ ├── mailstore/ # encrypted Maildir storage
|
||||
│ ├── managesieve/ # RFC 5804 ManageSieve server
|
||||
│ ├── oauth2/ # hand-rolled OAuth2 client (auth code grant + refresh)
|
||||
│ ├── pipeline/ # SPF/DKIM/DMARC/header/URL security checks
|
||||
│ ├── pop3/ # POP3 server (off by default)
|
||||
│ ├── ratelimit/ # per-key token-bucket rate limiter (SMTP/IMAP/HTTP)
|
||||
│ ├── sieve/ # RFC 5228 Sieve interpreter (lexer/parser/exec)
|
||||
│ ├── queue/ # outbound retry queue + MX delivery
|
||||
│ ├── smtp/ # SMTP server (inbound MTA + submission)
|
||||
│ ├── tlsutil/ # self-signed cert generation + ACMEManager (SNI-aware serving, renewal)
|
||||
│ ├── totp/ # RFC 6238 TOTP MFA — verified against real published test vectors
|
||||
│ ├── vcard/ # minimal RFC 6350 parser/builder
|
||||
│ ├── webmail/ # REST API + embedded Tailwind SPA
|
||||
│ └── webtoken/ # hand-rolled JWT (HS256, plus scoped Purpose tokens for MFA/reset)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Native Gmail/Graph API providers (as opposed to the IMAP+OAuth2 path
|
||||
already built) are not yet in `internal/accounts` — see Phase 10's
|
||||
deferred-items list above. `internal/dane`, `internal/mtasts`, and
|
||||
`internal/tlsrpt` don't exist yet — see Phase 13's deferred-items list.
|
||||
No `internal/webauthn` (passkeys) — see Phase 12's deferred-items list;
|
||||
`internal/totp` exists and is fully wired. That's the complete list of
|
||||
genuinely unstarted packages as of the end of Phase 15 — every other
|
||||
phase in the original plan has at least a core-complete, tested
|
||||
implementation.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user