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# mailgoserver
A self-hosted email server in one static Go binary: SMTP (send + receive, direct-to-MX
delivery, DKIM signing), IMAP mailbox storage, an admin web dashboard, and a self-service
webmail portal. It's a Go port of PyMTA-server — same feature set, one process instead of
a Python venv + separate services.
## What it does
- **SMTP MTA** — accepts mail for domains you configure, relays outbound mail directly
to the recipient's MX (no smarthost needed), signs outgoing mail with DKIM, and
enforces per-domain sender authentication or IP whitelisting so it can't be used as an
open relay.
- **IMAP mailbox storage** — real, retrievable mailboxes (Thunderbird, Outlook, any IMAP
client) with AES-encrypted-at-rest message storage, per-mailbox quotas, send-as
aliases, and filter rules (move to folder, forward, discard, based on from/subject/
body conditions with AND/OR logic).
- **Spam filtering** — a built-in heuristic score always runs; optionally point it at an
[rspamd](https://rspamd.com) instance for a lot more signal (see `docker-deploy/` for
a container that bundles rspamd for you).
- **Webmail portal** (`/webmail`) — inbox/folders, HTML compose with attachments,
drafts, search, keyboard shortcuts, conversation grouping, recipient autocomplete,
filter-rule management, and PGP (OpenPGP encrypt/decrypt/sign/verify) and S/MIME
(sign/verify) support per mailbox.
- **Admin dashboard** (`/pymta-manager`) — manage domains, senders, mailboxes, DKIM
keys, IP whitelisting, TLS (self-signed or Let's Encrypt via DNS-01: Cloudflare,
Route53, DigitalOcean, Google Cloud DNS), and review email + auth logs.
- **Security hardening built in** — CSRF protection, security headers (CSP, X-Frame-
Options, etc.), Cloudflare-aware trusted-proxy IP resolution, login rate limiting and
account lockout, TOTP + WebAuthn/passkey MFA (admin and mailbox owners), and automatic
temporary IP blacklisting for SMTP/IMAP brute-force or relay-abuse attempts with an
admin-visible Blacklist page and dashboard attack-count tiles.
## Quick start
### Docker (fastest)
```bash
cd docker-deploy
docker compose --profile standalone up -d --build
```
See [`docker-deploy/README.md`](docker-deploy/README.md) for the rspamd-bundled variant
and full details (ports, volumes, first-boot config).
### From source
```bash
go build -o mailgoserver .
./mailgoserver
```
One static binary — no venv, no `pip install`, no gunicorn. Requires Go 1.26+ to build;
the binary itself has no runtime dependencies (pure-Go SQLite driver, no cgo).
## What to expect on first run
There's no config to write up front. The first time it starts in a given working
directory, it generates:
- `settings.ini` — every setting with an inline comment explaining it (SMTP/IMAP ports,
hostname, TLS, DKIM key size, mailbox quotas, MFA enforcement, rate limits, and so
on). Regenerated only if missing — it's never overwritten or merged into on later
runs, so edits stick.
- A self-signed TLS certificate (used until you either supply your own or enable Let's
Encrypt from the admin dashboard).
- An empty SQLite database, with one seeded admin account: username `admin`, password
`Password123!`. Logging in with it **immediately forces** a username + password
change before anything else in the dashboard is reachable — the default credentials
can never be left in place.
- A mailstore master key and a CSRF-signing app secret, both generated once and reused
on every subsequent start — back these up like any other secret (losing the mailstore
master key makes all stored mail unrecoverable, even for admins).
From there: log into `/pymta-manager`, add a domain (and complete its DNS ownership
verification), add a mailbox or sender, and you're sending/receiving. The bare `/` root
redirects to the webmail login (`/webmail/login`) by default, since most visitors are
mailbox owners, not admins — there's a "Login as Admin" link from there to
`/pymta-manager`.
Default ports (all configurable in `settings.ini`): SMTP `25`, direct-TLS SMTP `465`,
IMAP `143`, direct-TLS IMAP `993` — the real standard mail ports, so binding them
directly needs root or `setcap` (see below), which the Docker deployment already
handles for you. Admin/webmail HTTP `5000` / HTTPS `5001` stay deliberately
non-privileged; put a reverse proxy or your own `80`/`443` mapping in front of those if
you want the dashboard on standard web ports too.
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## Build
```bash
cd mailgoserver
go build -o mailgoserver .
```
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## Bind ports 25/143/465/993 without root
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The default SMTP/IMAP ports are the real standard ones now, so running the binary
directly (not via Docker) needs one of:
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```bash
sudo setcap 'cap_net_bind_service=+ep' ./mailgoserver
```
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or run it as root, or via the systemd unit below (which grants the capability instead
of running as root). Same purpose as `script_setup_py_environment.sh`'s `setcap` step
on the Python venv, applied to the compiled binary instead. **Not needed for the Docker
deployment** — those containers run as root, so binding 25/143/465/993 directly just
works with no extra setup.
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## systemd (unified process)
The Go binary runs the SMTP listeners and the web UI in one process (no GIL, so no
need to split them into separate services the way `script_install_service.sh` split
`pymta-smtp.service` / `pymta-web.service` for the Python version). One unit is enough:
```ini
[Unit]
Description=mailgoserver (SMTP + web admin)
After=network.target
[Service]
Type=simple
WorkingDirectory=/opt/mailgoserver
ExecStart=/opt/mailgoserver/mailgoserver --host 127.0.0.1 --port 5000
Restart=always
RestartSec=5
AmbientCapabilities=CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
PrivateTmp=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ReadWritePaths=/opt/mailgoserver
ProtectHome=true
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
```
If you do want the SMTP and web parts as separate services (matching the Python
split exactly), run two units with `--smtp-only` and `--web-only` respectively —
both flags exist for this.
## nginx
No changes needed. `script_nginx_setup.sh` reverse-proxies to `http://127.0.0.1:5000`
and terminates its own TLS for the web UI — mailgoserver listens on the same host:port
by default, so the existing nginx config works unmodified. The SMTP TLS listener still
consumes `ssl_certs/server.crt`/`server.key`, same as before.
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## Docker
See [`docker-deploy/`](docker-deploy/) — a standalone image and one that bundles the
latest rspamd in the same container, both via a single `docker-compose.yml` using
Compose profiles.
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## Admin dashboard login
First run seeds one account: username `admin`, password `Password123!`. Logging in
with it immediately forces a username + password change before anything else in the
dashboard is reachable — the default credentials can never be left in place.
Optional second factors, enabled per-account from **Account** in the sidebar:
- **Authenticator app (TOTP)** — works anywhere, no extra config.
- **Passkeys / security keys (WebAuthn)** — bound to the exact origin the dashboard
is served at. Set `[Auth] rp_id` / `rp_origin` in `settings.ini` to your real public
domain before registering passkeys in production (e.g. `rp_id = mail.example.com`,
`rp_origin = https://mail.example.com`). The defaults (`localhost` /
`http://localhost:5000`) only work for local testing — WebAuthn requires either
HTTPS or the literal host `localhost`, so passkeys need the nginx+TLS setup above
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(or the Docker deployment) to work behind a real domain.
## Abuse protection
Failed SMTP/IMAP auth attempts (bad passwords, denied relay attempts) are counted per
source IP; once a configurable threshold is hit within a window, that IP is temporarily
blocked at the listener level — before the SMTP/IMAP banner is even sent — with the
block duration doubling on repeat offenses up to a cap. Manage active blocks and exempt
trusted IPs from this check entirely from **Blacklist** in the admin sidebar (a global-
admin-only page) — this is separate from the IP whitelist used to authorize
unauthenticated relay for a domain. Tunable in `settings.ini`'s `[Security]` section.
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---
## License
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See [LICENSE](LICENSE).