Files
mailgoserver/internal/webui/auth.go
T

199 lines
6.2 KiB
Go

package webui
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"mailgoserver/internal/db"
)
const (
sessionCookieName = "mailgoserver_session"
sessionTTL = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
)
type ctxKey int
const (
ctxUserKey ctxKey = iota
ctxScopeKey
)
// accessScope is which domains the current admin can see/manage. A global admin
// bypasses the domain-ID check entirely; a scoped admin is restricted to exactly the
// domains in DomainIDs — computed once per request in requireAuth and reused by every
// handler via scopeFromContext, rather than re-querying esrv_admin_domain_access
// repeatedly within the same request.
type accessScope struct {
Global bool
DomainIDs map[int64]bool
}
func (s accessScope) Allowed(domainID int64) bool {
return s.Global || s.DomainIDs[domainID]
}
// IDs returns the accessible domain IDs as a slice — nil (not empty) for a global
// admin, since "nil" is the signal callers should treat as "no filter" rather than
// "empty set" when building an IN (...) clause or similar.
func (s accessScope) IDs() []int64 {
if s.Global {
return nil
}
ids := make([]int64, 0, len(s.DomainIDs))
for id := range s.DomainIDs {
ids = append(ids, id)
}
return ids
}
func scopeFromContext(r *http.Request) accessScope {
s, _ := r.Context().Value(ctxScopeKey).(accessScope)
return s
}
// requireGlobalAdmin gates a handler behind the current admin's scope being global —
// used for server-wide settings (Server Settings, Let's Encrypt) that a domain-scoped
// admin has no business reading or changing, even if they can guess the URL. 404 (not
// 403) matches requireDomainAccess's reasoning: a scoped admin shouldn't be able to
// tell "doesn't exist" from "exists but isn't mine" by probing.
func (a *App) requireGlobalAdmin(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !scopeFromContext(r).Global {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
next(w, r)
}
}
// requireDomainAccess checks the current admin's scope covers domainID; if not, it
// writes a 404 (not 403 — a scoped admin shouldn't be able to distinguish "doesn't
// exist" from "exists but isn't mine" by probing IDs) and returns false, matching the
// existing "not found" handling every route already does for a missing resource.
func requireDomainAccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, domainID int64) bool {
if scopeFromContext(r).Allowed(domainID) {
return true
}
http.NotFound(w, r)
return false
}
func (a *App) buildAccessScope(user *db.AdminUser) (accessScope, error) {
if user.IsGlobalAdmin {
return accessScope{Global: true}, nil
}
ids, err := a.DB.AccessibleDomainIDs(user.ID)
if err != nil {
return accessScope{}, err
}
m := make(map[int64]bool, len(ids))
for _, id := range ids {
m[id] = true
}
return accessScope{DomainIDs: m}, nil
}
func setSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, token string, secure bool) {
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
Name: sessionCookieName,
Value: token,
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: secure,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
MaxAge: int(sessionTTL.Seconds()),
})
}
func clearSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter) {
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{Name: sessionCookieName, Value: "", Path: "/", MaxAge: -1})
}
// currentSession loads the session + user for the request's cookie, if any and valid
// (exists, not expired). A nil session/user (no error) means "not logged in".
func (a *App) currentSession(r *http.Request) (*db.AdminSession, *db.AdminUser, error) {
c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName)
if err != nil || c.Value == "" {
return nil, nil, nil
}
sess, err := a.DB.GetSession(c.Value)
if err != nil || sess == nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
if time.Now().After(sess.ExpiresAt) {
_ = a.DB.DeleteSession(sess.Token)
return nil, nil, nil
}
user, err := a.DB.GetAdminUserByID(sess.UserID)
if err != nil || user == nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return sess, user, nil
}
func userFromContext(r *http.Request) *db.AdminUser {
u, _ := r.Context().Value(ctxUserKey).(*db.AdminUser)
return u
}
// requireAuth gates every admin route behind a valid, fully-authenticated session:
// logged in, second factor satisfied if one is enabled, and not stuck in the forced
// first-login credential change. Unauthenticated/incomplete requests are redirected
// to the right step of the login flow rather than shown an error.
func (a *App) requireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
sess, user, err := a.currentSession(r)
if err != nil {
a.Logger.Error("session lookup: %v", err)
}
if sess == nil || user == nil {
http.Redirect(w, r, Prefix+"/login?next="+r.URL.Path, http.StatusFound)
return
}
// hasMFA: this account already has a second factor configured (TOTP or a
// passkey) — distinct from sess.MFAVerified, which is about *this session*
// having satisfied it.
hasMFA := user.TOTPEnabled
if !hasMFA {
if n, _ := a.DB.CountWebAuthnCredentials(user.ID); n > 0 {
hasMFA = true
}
}
if hasMFA && !sess.MFAVerified {
http.Redirect(w, r, Prefix+"/login/mfa", http.StatusFound)
return
}
if user.MustChangePassword && r.URL.Path != Prefix+"/first-login" {
http.Redirect(w, r, Prefix+"/first-login", http.StatusFound)
return
}
// enforce_admin_mfa applies to every admin, global or scoped — force setup at
// /account (which has the TOTP/passkey enrollment forms) before anything else
// is reachable, mirroring the must_change_password gate above. Checked after
// must_change_password so a brand-new admin sets a real password first.
if !hasMFA && !user.MustChangePassword && a.Cfg.Section("Auth").Key("enforce_admin_mfa").MustBool(false) {
if r.URL.Path != Prefix+"/account" && !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, Prefix+"/account/") {
http.Redirect(w, r, Prefix+"/account", http.StatusFound)
return
}
}
scope, err := a.buildAccessScope(user)
if err != nil {
a.Logger.Error("build access scope: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxUserKey, user)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxScopeKey, scope)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}